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Reform in three Phases: -Genesis
of the West German Federal
Framework Law for Higher
Education-1976.
by
Joyce M. Mushaben
i

Die Staatsgewalt geht vom Volke aus.
Aber wo geht sie hin?
-- Bertold Brecht

For .more than a decade, academic institutions.have been under
fire.

Unlike ihe phoenix, however, the prfncipl~ of university

autonomy has not emerged unscathed from the ashes of what has been
labeled a "revolutjon in the relationship of law and ·social pol icy. 111
As institutions of higher learning become all the more dependent
upon pub] ic financing throughout advan~ed industrial nations, they
are steadily befog pulled into their· respective central politicallegal systems.

Decisions bearing on the administration as well as

the substance of higher education have become the domain of state
legislatures, the federal bureaucracies and lately of the. courts·.
This work focuses on the manner in which German ·superior courts
first sought to influence and ultimately came to dominate the
university reform process du~ing the period of 1965-1979.

I argue

that the judiciary has ·served as the primary veh1c1~ for political
conflict resolution (or avoidance); in so doing, the constitutional
and administrative courts have become the single .most important
element in the university task environm~nt with regard to the process
of legislative reform.

Rulings issued by .the Federal Constitutional

Court (Bundesverfassungsgeri cht) have ta.ck 1ed head on the most con- ·
troversial.issues facing German high~r education, including questions
of admissions criteria, the determination of classroom· 11 capacities 11

2

and acceptable teaching loads, restrictions on the participation
of faculty, students and staff in declsions on teaching and research, and government supervision of personnel pol icy. · These
rultngs

by educational non-experts have been translated into

legally codified g~rde1ines for the L~nder governments under ihe
guise of the 1976 Federal Framework Law for Higher Education
-

(Hochschulrahmengesetz = HRG).
Thepaper begins with a general history of the university

·reform process,
arguing that changes within the German institutions of higher learning over the last ten years have, for the·
most part, been externally induced.
cess into three stages,

11

It divides the reform pro-

expa_nsion,l 1 "standardization

II

and

rationa-lization, 11 and testifies to a number of major shifts in
academic reform objectives accompanying each phase.

then ex-

~mine the impact of three Federal Constitutional Court
decisions on the reform measures undertaken by German parliamentarians.

Finally, I conclude with a summary of reform accomplish-_

ments to date, along with a general assessment of the significance of judicial activism brought to bear on German higher
ii

educational politics.
A.

THE SETTING: "HIGH TIME" FOR EDUCATIONAL REFORM
Because of its ~tatus as an advanced industrial society,

the German Federal Republic could be thought to share many of
the goals of its Western neighbors.

Yet in a comparison of

3

educat.ional reforms among European Community nations within the
last two decades, the FRG clearly lagged behind.
~

'

In 1965,

'

Torsten Husen maintained that the We.st German educational system·
served as
. The

11

11

a present day European example of a failure to plan. 112

educational catastrophy, 11 first •explored in depth by Georg

Picht in 1964, was particufarly visible at the tertiary level.3
Academic institutions continued to be dominated by the kinds of
hierarchial structures and authoritarian teaching methods that had·
characterized Ger:man education prior to 1939.

Reforms in the areas

of curricula revision, teacher fraining programs, university
governance and admissions policies were lon·g overdue.

Further,

despite the post-war commitment to more democratic forms of socio-·
political organization, the number of students from working class
families admitted to the universities remained at the level of
five·to ten percent -- even though enrollments had more than
doubled by 1965,
Picht demanded that education be made the nation's number one
domestic priority for:pedagogical as we.11 as for social and
economic reasons.

First, he. warned that an extreme shortage of

teachers and classroom facilities was inevitable, in light of the
additional two mill ion children about to descend upon the country's
elementary schools -- the first wave of the post-war Baby Boom;
obviously the qua I ity of education would be seriously impaired if
existing personnel and classroom space were only to be maintained at

4

existing levels.
'i

Secondly, Pkht pointed to significant im-

balances at the L~nder level, owing to the decentralized

.

administration of education; school children in. provincial-agricultural regions in ~articula~ were not able to meet even the
comparatively low-level national standards, and family transfers
from state to state disadvantaged elem~ntary-aged pupils more
than their elders.

Thirdly, Picht projected the end of Wi.rtschaftswulider.

In an age of technology and specializati'on, an educational system
based on 19th.century philosophical prJnciples posed a threat to
the economic health of society as a whole.

Entrance into the

Common Market and increasing international competition required
the

11

production 11 of ever greater numbers of ski.lled laborers, which

would hike the price (and the value) of education at all levels.
The primary fi.nancer in Germany had always been the State; but·
public investment in education had, in fact, decreased from 3.31
percent of the national budget in 1958 to 3.26 percent in 1960 and
2.9 percent in 1962~

Picht placed the blame on the .form of cultural-

educational administration: the L~nder exercised complete control·
· over legislation and administration, while planning and financing
powers not specifically delegated in the Basic law-wer~ coveted by
authorities at the national level.
ln·J965, sociologi~t Ralf Dahrendorf underscored· Pi~ht's
analysis of impending doom.

Then he introduced another critical

variable which was to become the bane of university existence,~-

5

II

the notion that Bildung ist Burgerrecht -- education, in the larger
sense, is a ci~il right. 5 Dahrendorf emphasized that educational
reform was hot only crucial in regard-to the- nation's·future economic
and scientific demands, but also in 1 i_ght of changing social needs.
Affluence~ he argued, was onl~ one dimension of freedom in a
democratic society.

Article-12/1 of the Grundgesetz (the "Baste Law"

serving ~s the provisional con9titution) guaranteed a11 ~~tizeMs the
right to choose freely their vocations, educational- facll ities and
pl aces of work, as did respective artld es in the L~nder stat~tes. ·
The State had no.alternative but to make -Chancengleidiheit --- equal
opportunity -- the basis of subsequent-educational reforms.

In

_retrospect, it was the introduction of constitutional rights into the
reform discussion at this early date that unleashed the Furies of
11

Pol iticization 11 and

11

legal ization!' which. have plagued reform efforts

at the tertiary level for the last ten years, a development to which
I shall return later on.
B.

PIECEMEAL ENGINEERING:

REFORM IN -THREE STJlGES -

_In principle, the Federal ~epublic's approach to higher educational reform bears a certain resemblance to what Cyert and March
have labeled

11

problemistic search. 116 - Accepting the judgment -of the

academic community that the system was_ 11 healthy at the core, 11
university reformers limited themselves initially to making 11marginal
adjustments" on the alternatives already_ in use.7

By simply broai:fen-

ing.access to existing academic structures, they hoped to ·circumvent

6

the impending shortages prophesied by Picht.
Under the circumstances, expansion of the tertiary sector was
a logical first choice in the search for reform alternatives, beglnning in 1965.

Recuperating from the radical reductions of 1933-1939,

university enrollments returned to normal levels_by 1952; stabiliza- •
·-

tion was short-lived, however.

Institutions of higher learning ex-

perienced a 76 percent increase between 1952 and 1960,: and a further
enrollment rise of 100 percent during the period 1960-1970.

But the

real "educational explosion" would occur between 1970 and 1975: the
number of students was to skyrocket an additional 180 percent. 8
Phase I, 1965 to 1970, saw educational authorities adopt a
variety of expansion strategies, beginning with the creation of
eighteen new higher educational institutions.

Officials further

attacked the space problem by expanding the existing un·iversitie.s;
by transforming specialized institutes into

11

regular 11 universities;

by: adding requirements and then accrediting technical schools with
higher -educational status; by shifting labs and institutes, as we11as other support structures to permit better utilization of available spaces. -The next step was to swell the rolls of ttie academic
;;

teaching staff, adding a new stratum of junior faculty (Mittelbau)
in order to restore student-teacher ratios to- the normal levels of
the 1950 1 s.

In fact, the ranks expanded from 9,000

11

assistants 11

in 1960, to-18,000 Jn 1965, to 28,000 by-1971. 9
These expansion measures produced two unintended results: 1) the

7

increased supply actually exacerbated the d.emand for university
education in the midst of the baby b?om; and 2) ,rapid.institutional
growth precipitated internal crises of coordin~ti~n and juthoriti.
· Federal expenditures to higher education had increased by 500 percent, while control over the allocation of those monies remained
constitutionally-vested in· the L~nder.

In order for the Bund to

succeed in eff~ctively dist~ibOtJng s~bsldies ~o the L~nder and to
ensure their use for expansion purposes, federal authorities hel~
that it was necessary to simplify their deatiMgs with th~ respective
recipients~

The mode of universit~~dministration differed sis-

nifican-tly from state to.state, and coordination depended upon
voluntary compliance by the L~nder.
Phase II, extending -from 1968 to 1972 was characterized by a
more active attempt on the part of state officials at both -levels.·
to direct pressing intraorganizationa1 and interinstitutional
reforms.

StandardJzation was a strategy intended to aid the

national executive in concentrating and managing-its

11

new'assistance

relationships, 11 while bringing a broad range of conflicting state
educational priorities more clearly into line wit_h each other and
,;

with national SPD reform orientations (especially after 1969)~

The

l~nder viewed standardization as an opportunity for di~tating
structural -reforms (replacing traditional

11

Faculties 11 with depart-

ments), and str~amlining university ad~issions and governance procedures (switching to a presidential-management system).

Authorities

8

moreover became conscious of the need to agree on more unified
academic·programs to facilitate student transfers across state lines
.d d . • ·
. •
10
t o 1ess crow e un1vers1t1es.

Overcrowding in fact became·~ major problem by 1972,. making
.it necessary for individual universities to impose.numerical li~ita-

t ions on ·student admissions.

Enrollment project ions issued by the

new Federal Education Ministry of 280,000 for 1978 and 560,000 for
1980 had been surpassed by 1,60 registrations (291,000) and 1971
· .

·figures (587,400} respectively.

11

On October 20, 1'972, the eleven

Ll::nder ministers institutionalized t.he Numerus clausus system by
cr~ating a Central Office for Student Admissions in Dortmund.
.

The

'

Numerus clausus principle applied especially to those seeking to
enroll iri architecture, biology, chemistry, dentistry, medicine,
pharmacy, psychology and the veterinary sciences.
Face to face with the brooding giant of finite fiscal resources
that \I/as conjured up by the recession of 1971-72 and the inflationary
effects of the 1972-73 energy crisis, the Federal Finance Ministry
brought university expansion programs to a dramatic halt.

Owing to.

fiscal constraints, educationa.1 authorities were forced to pursue a
strategy of rationalization, between 1972 and 1976.

The. objective

of this particular reform exercise was to produce~ graduates
\1/ith higher qualifications in less time at lower~ to concerned
German taxpayers.

T_he L~nd.er ministers of education took advantage

of the brake on national expansion measures to extend their powers

9

with respect to the regulation of examinaitions, and with that, to
intensify their involvement in the curricular refol'.lll proc;ess.

Steps

to streamline curricula and the impo~ition of tougher exam requirements were intended to

depol iticize 11 the academic environment, as

11
.

wel_l as to di sci pl ine individual university activists.
By the end of the 1960 1 s, finance had become the most critical
aspect of university administration and, consequently, a major source
.

•..

.

11

of constitutional conflict between the Sund and the Lander.
II

In 1969

.

the Lander were forced to accept a constitutional amendment (91b) that
extended federal jurisdiction over the higher educational sector in
exchange for one (91a) that promised significant federal assistance
• t h e areas o f agr1cu
' 1tura 1 , coasta
.
1 an d reg1ona
.
'
1 deve t opment. 12
1n

Amendment 91"b led to a number of parliamentary acts dealing with
university construction and federal budg_etary procedures, which in
turn were to lay groundwork for

a natfo~al

Higher Education Act. 13

Federal Educational Minister Leussink presented the first legislative
draft to parliament in 1971; but by 1972~ political winds had begun
to shift.

While the SPD consolidated its majority in the Bundestag

following the 1972 national elections, state-level e·lections produced
a CCU-dominated Bundesrat, thatwas ready, willing and able to
exercise a suspensive veto against three subsequent drafts of the
Framework Law.

It goes without saying that the German_ university

was a house divided, owing to the disruptive effects of the antiVietnam protests and the student movement.

Sund and L~nder authori-

ties carried their political differences and jurisdictional disp·utes

I
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Into the halls of parl lament, each hoping to play the role of "the
state to the rescue."
The po I It I ca I atmosphere d t d not bode we I I for _the hr gher edcat I on a I system.

Two sets of concerns, restoring pol ltlcal order

and the health of the economy, .figured heavl ly In setting the legts I at Ive stage for the un Ivers I ty reform b 111 • . Even before the Federa I Ministry had submitted Its first off lclal proposal In 1971,
legislative debates over developments In the tertiary sector left
members of par I lament with lfan after taste of something controver-

.
14
sial, something problematic and of.questfonable_value. 11

Pessi-

mistic from the start, their pol ltlcal dispositions I-ed -German·
parl lamentarlans to sound the death-knel I tor untverstty autonomy
-- long before they were to succeed In preparI_ng, revising and promulg.atlng t~e Framework Law.

C.

JUDICIAL STIMULUS, LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE:
OF THE HOa-lSCHULAAiMENGESETZ (HRG)

THE GENESIS

Reformers h.ad emp I eyed a vart ety of strateg t es, expans ton and
experimentation, standardization and rational izatton, and st! 11: the
"university problem" persl·sted.

Indeed, by 1970 the higher educa-

tional crisis appeared to have grown much worse.· Technological special izatlon was becoming the sine qua non of a stable.Gennan economy,
Increasing the demands that would be made on the higher educational
sector.

The Sund had sought to expand_ tts framework powers; now It

would be co_mpel led to use them more extensively, pol itlcs permitting.
Forced to cede power after the 1969 elections, the Chrisi"tan

11

Democratic Union took Issue with the SPO's slate of soclal reforms
In genera I · and -en I 1-sted the a Id of the courts ear I y i n 1973 to cha 11enge the pol lcles of Ostpol ltlk and, later, lndustrlal co-determtnatlon, In particular.

Lacking an effective pa_r-1 lamentaty majority,

one might dare to argue, the CCU/CSU came to view the Judicial process as Its own channel for "extraparllamentary opposltlon."

15

The

ut 11 i zat I ori of the Jud I c I a I forum to debate academ I c .refonn quest Ions
was therefore not unprecedented.
Since the early 1970's, judicial action In the Federal Republic·
has Indeed had a significant effect on the governing structures and.
admissions policies of academlc instltutlons.

And there Is evidence

of a growing tendency in the direction of "Juridical lzation" or
Verrechtl tchung of questions raised in a variety of pol fey domains.
Jurtdlcallzatlon Is used here to encompass the·comblned effects of
legal codification and courtroom Interpretation of parliamentary
statutes.

Jurldical!zatlon, or what others have more broadly labeled

"polltlclzed-legallsm," Is the process whereby "the constitution Is
repeatedly Invoked and Its principles elaborated and lnterpreted in
exhaustive detal I.

Such legal Ism channels recurrent conflicts among

pol ltlcal or Ideological factions- iii many lnstltut-lons."

16

Historically, the German system of Jurisprudence has been more
concerned with Interpreting and c;1dherlng to the letter of the law,
than It has with expounding upon Its spirit •. The court's role has
. been an Inherently conservative one Cresting on Roman Law), tha-t of
tes-ttng curren-t practices against the dlcta-tes of Baste Law provisions

12

and restrictions. · In recent years, however.,. the courts have cane
to fol low a course of greater social activism.

Iron really enough,

It Is that other stronghold of conservatism., the COU/CSU, which
has compel led the judiciary to abandon its old strict-constructron:..
1st approach.
A number of statutes related to civH servfce requirements,
federal budgetary procedures and, of course, university construction subsidies promulgated between 1969 and_ 1971 .laid the foundation· for a national Higher Education Act. · The ft.rst legfslative
•.

draft presented to parlfamerit in t971 provoked strong partisan
reaction.

The SPD versfon foresaw the Introduction of the compre-

hensive university nationwide, Included provtslons tor currtcular
and personnel reform, and ac:cepted the principle of Institutional
self-determfnatfon (Mttbestlmnung) subject to no specific parity
regulation.

Shortly thereafter, the CCU/CSU presented tts own

draft to the Bundestag~ which contained a radically df fferent approach to universfty governance and rejected the lmposttfon of the
"fntegrated"· comprehensive model as the nonn governing ·further expansion efforts.
In a landmark decision In 1972~ the Court found that the Nu-·
merus clausus system devised to meliorate the overcrowding of·especial ly popular dlscfpl fnes violated the precepts of Art. 12/1 GG.
· In short, the Numerus clausus rested "on the border of constitutional lty;" I.ts appl I cation was permissible if ·and only ff the educ:atlonal fact I ity In question could prove that Its departmental.

. 13

capactttes were In fact completely exhausted, and untl I such time
as the legislators succeeded In establ fshtng spectflc, nondtscrlmtnatory admissions crlteria or, alternatively,• Tntroduced a "lot17
tery" system.
The Court, In essence, challenged federal lawmakers to develop objective and un lvers~1{ ty app I Icab le norms for
admission decisions, a prerogative that had been exercised solely
by the unlversfty In former times.

The Justices nonethe.less· ex-

. pressed their strong preference for academic achievement, waltfng
time and "hardship" criteria, affirming the selection procedures
II

:

.

•

.

i.nfonnal ly agreed upon by the Lander ministers prior to their Interstate compact of October, 1972. The.Court also exhorted the
members of parliament to devise the means for extending university
capacities.

In so doing, the Judiciary establ !shed itself as an

advocate of university expansion.
The t l nanc Ia I crunch wli Ich . fo-1 Iowed In the wake of the 1973-74
recession ultimately curtailed common federal-state efforts to expand the hlgher·educatlonal system any further.

Yet ever more In-

dividuals who had been denied en1'ry, owing to overcrowding, appealed
to the administrative courts on the basis of their Art. 12/1 rights.
11
.
Court action
served to expedite Lander
reaction, an d 19 74 saw an-

other trial effort by the states and the West German Rectors' Con~
ference to design a more reliable system for measuring university
capacities. (Kapazltgtsverordnungen), since. too many of the would-be
students were actually winning S!! Jure contests.

Not that there

was a great deal of legal loglc to the successes met by Individual

14

claimants.

At the Admlnlstratlve Court ln Berl In, for examp.le, pe'

tltloners whose last names began with A through K were handed 48
rejections in the th.I rd chamber, at the same t.lme those with the
ft rst In It i a Is L to Z came away wI th 57 acceptances fran the fourteenth Chamber (out of ·60 or so cases); meanwh T le, the -twe I fth ·
.

Chamberspeciallzed In granting "temporary Injunctions."

18

The narrow t nterpretat Ions of capac I ty ord I narices . Imposed by
the administrative judges In the interim not only. gav.e· rlse to a
whole new breed of lawyers spectallzlng In Numerus clausus cases.
They also noticeably and
stead 11 y Increased the teachfog load of each professor
and teaching assistant. Moreover, by specifying which
courses must be taught and which are more superfluous
such t nterpretatlons have -even, for the fl rst time In .
the history of the German university, systematical ty
and effectively s_y_bjected to_external controls the .92!!..tent of courses /my emphas l,Y. · t 9
Once again the Administrative Court In Berl ln provides a classic example.

The Judges declared in 1976 that Instead of requiring

med I ca I students to attend a mIn !mum of 32
Cthe

cI ass

hours per semester ·

norm set by the natl ona I Assoc I at I on of Med 1·ca I Facu I ty for a 11

West German institutions, not yet afftrmed by the city-state's Education minister), the Free University was to·reduce Its requirement
to 24 hours of Instruction per semester.

20

·

In the filial analysts then,-the Judiciary played a direct and
not inconsequential role In the process of ratlonalizatton for higher
education, Involving itself In the. detennlnatlon of what are more or
less cost-effective courses of instruction.

15

Unable to implement directly their own strategy for higher educational reform, conservattve elements Joined forces to block the
"democratr clzatlon" tactics of the SPD •. On May 29, 1973, the Federal Constitutional Court (Buridesverfassungsgerlght.) passed down a
· deers I on In favor- of 398 p rofessor-s and assoc I ates, who opposed
the Higher Educational "Pref lmtnary Law" CVorschaltsgesetz) In
Lower Saxony.

The Court ruled that three-way parity In university

decision-making organs violated the constitutional rights of the
·senior academic staff members as posited In Art. 5/3 GG, cited
l~nfra.

Moreover, the Court held that these full professors were

to be guaranteed at least one half of the seats in any body regulattng teaching and examinations (massgebender Einfluss), and. assured a clear majority (ausschlaggebender Einfluss) In matters of
academic hiring, firing and research (even though tenured full professors_ in most institutions were outnumbered at least two or three
to one by junior faculty and 1-ecturers
d_emtc functions).

charged with primary aca-

Consequently, It was the Constltutlonal Court

which tock the first critical step In the standardtzatton of university governance:

by recogn !zing In prlnclp le the need for rep-

resentation of al I groups directly affected- by academic decisions
In central university organs, at the same time I lmiting propo~ttonately the amount of tnfluence each of these groups could bring
to bear on final decision according to their level of "qua! lftcatton."21
Whereas the Numerus ct ausus ru I t ngs had effect of "throw Ing

16

university to the wolves" on case-by-case basts, the Impact of the
Group University dectston was Immediate and unlversal.

Berl In leg-··

lslators., who had announced In January 1973 that there would be no
major amendments to their Higher Education Act prior to the su~er
of 1975, were the fti-st to rallroad through the legtslature an Adaptat I on Law s I gn 1.f i cant I y a I ter Tng the proport Iona I compos It I on
of un Ivers I ty dee! slon-makl ng organs on November 19, 1973.

22 ·

Another const!tutlonaJ paradox awaited court resolution In 1975.
Article 5/~ GG asserts:.
Art and science, research and teaching shal I be free. Free-·
dom of teach Ing sha 11 not abso Ive from I oya I ty to the const ! tut I on.
·
In January, 1972, Chancel I.or Brandt joined the heads of the lJtnder governments fn formulating guide! Ines with respect to the publ le
employment of right and left wing radicals CExtremlstenbeschluss of
February 18, 1972).

This ordinance was to subject civil service

candidates to "const!tutlonal loyalty" checks., prior to granting.
tenure.

Academics were Included_ In light of their classification

as clvi I servanfs.

Instead of checking personal histories only in

cases where "evidence" was already known to exist, the exception
qutckly became the rule.

Between 1973-1975, the state-level "con-

stlfutlonal protection office" in Berlin CLandeskommlsslon) had
.:

received 24,000 "lnquires'' and was able to provide "evldence" in
1,800 cases, 93 of which actually resulted In Tndlviduals being
barred from pub I le employmen-r.

In Savaria the figures were 55,000

" I nq u Ir I es," 342 wI th "ev i dence," and 23 emp I oyment bans., respectrvety.

23

'
I

I
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On May 22, 1975, the justices in_ Karlsruhe proclaimed· that
even those working for the state on a t:rlal or ·provisional basts
must submit to a test of their loyalty (medical and legal Interns).
The Constitutional Court decreed:
The pol ltlcal loyalty ·ob.I lgatlon requires mor'= than Just
a forma 11 y correct, but otherw I se disinterested., coo I ,
Internally-distant posture toward the state and the Constitution; It demands of the civl I servant In partlcular
that he clearly distance hlm~elf from groups and endeavors whl.ch attack, oppose· and defame this state, Its constltutl.Q.nal ly created organs and the val ld constitutional
order Lmy emphasis/.- 24
One presumes that court Itself wt 11 eventual .ly have to. judge what
constitutes academic discourse on alternative polTtlcal ideologies,
free polltlcal expression or a cool, distant posture towards the
existing German "stai"e."
In I lght of these developments, It ts clear that the extension of "pol itlclzed legal Ism" Into the domain of educational, reform pol Icy has created the conditions under_ which the Judlcial
branch of government emerges as the pub I l c' s veh l c I e for po I it I ca I
confl let resolution In the FRG.

Legislators are exhorted, even

admonished, to produce thelr own solutlons, but nonetheless find
th~ range of pol Icy alternatives narrowed with each new set of ju...
dlclal decl_sions.

This trend, frqm my perspective_, sugges-ts a

certain parallel to the decreasing administrative "elbow room"
afforded the universities In the management of academic affairs.
The lnsi'ltutlons of higher learning were ordered to reform themselves, whl le ~nder Interference made self-reorganization fir-si'
dtfflcult, later Impossible.

The courts In turn called the law-

18

makers to task for not provtdl-ng quick and effective soluttons to
· un Ivers i ty overcrowd Ing, wh I I e de I t neat frig areas In wh t ch the par-

1t ament would no longer be free to conduct.an expertmental or probI emf sttc search •.
Bad. enough that the legislators were obi !gated to adhere to a
number of proscrip:tlcns conta lned. In the Constitutiona·I Court
rulings; equally harmful to the concept of university autonomy was
the.fact that subsequent drafts of the Fra~work Law followed what
were essentially pollttcal prescriptions appearing In the Justices'
opinions accompanying the declstons.

Their argumentations have

become "ever I onger and ever more fundamenta I," ranging from 55
pages in the 1972 Numerus clausus case,

to 99 pages on the Group

University, to a 109 page exegesis regarding .a 1977 Numerus clausus
verdlct.

25 From-the perspective of untverslty observers, the draft

proposal had an Immediately negative Impact., tn that the polttlcal
nature of the debates did more to "divide and conquer" proponents
of more rad I ca I reform a I ternat l ves, than t t. d rd to premote adm In-

t strative effectiveness.

Worst of all, perhaps, was the fact that

the HRG not only premised to alter substantially the structure of
.·

university governance, thereby disregarding the prfnclple of lnstltutlona I sel f-determrnatlon.

It threatened at .the same time to

leave other critical dimensions of university activity, such as cur..:
rtcular reform and regulation of examination contents, open to the
.
"
di scret
ton of the Lander,
those who had been reca I c i trant reformers

t n the f i rst p I ace.-
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By 1976, the passage of the Framework Law had become a pol ltlca I end In Itself, rather than a means to a more effectlve system
. of hlgher learning -

a classlc case of goal displacement, e~pe-

. cl a 11 y on the part of the SPO, under much pressure from Its own
left wing, on the one hand, and COU/CSU forces, on the other.

Mem-

bers of the academic community In al I of the Ll!nder sharply crittc I zed the process as we I I as the product of f Ive years of educationa 1-1 eg Is I at Ive activity. · In this author's estlmatlon, the promulgatlon of the Hochschulrahmengesetz bolls down to a struggle between
federal and state-level authorities, a Jurlsdictlonal dispute exacerbated by opposing party-pol itlcal configurations at these two

·

levels and arbitrated by a supposedly non-pol ltlcal Judiciary.

The

HRG became law on January 29, 1976, not because It promised ariy
particularly outstanding advantages for the higher educational sys. tem, but because pol !ti clans -- because they are pol itlclans -needed to attend to other important business that had been postponed
In the struggles over the HRG.
D.

CONCLUSION:

JUDICIAL ACTION ANO .REFORM ACHIEVEMENTS.

The "high priests at Karlsruhe" have undeniably coritrtbuted·to
the Inst I tut Iona I I zatl on of what were suppose to be tempera ry, rT emergency" procedures.

Paragraph §3 HRG, which refers to the protection

of academic freedom, contains elements of the Bundesverfassungsgerlcht's
Radical Ordlnance Judgment of 1975.

The sections on universlty admis-

sions, §27-35 HRG, bear a very strong resemblance to the Consi"itutlonal
Court's Numerus clausus ruling ·of 1972.

§38 HRG dlrectly incorporates
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the precepts la,td down tn the Group University verdict of 1979.
On October 23, 1976 the justices declared §32, Section 3/2

HRG

(deal-Ing wltli waiting periods for admissions) null and void.
They also susp.ended temporart ly §35 HRG, which divorces appttcatlons and chances for admission trom one's place of residence.
One legal critic has label led the terminology and the textual.·_ -

_-

.

.

out I Ina of the Framework Law an exercise in "Karlsruhe-clzatlon."

u

Judlclal efforts to resolve conf I lets between the Sund and

"

.

.

the Lander, SPD and CDLI fact I ens, po 11 t I c i ans and bureaucrats are
not without pol ltlcal· costs.

The solutions advanced by the Judi-

e la I branch are temporary_ at best; every· act of -Interpretation,
every textual exegesis produces new elements of law.

Each de-

cision tends to breed Its own brand of confl let In new areas, not
to mention the manner In whlch 1t·contrfbutes appreciably to the _
Coul'"t's own workload.

As the dissenting Justtces tn the Group·

Unlve,:-sity case shrewdly warned in 1973, the judiciary has been
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captured by the lrreverslbI I tty of Its own decisions. -

,

The

carved-In-stone character of Constitutional Court rulings means,
on the one hand,that Judlctal actors have become the recognized
managers of an Inter-dependence which they In part have helped to
create.

The other side of the coin Is that academic Institutions

In the 'Federal Repub I le have been deprived permaneni"ly of the right
to establish primary educational goals and to determine the besi"
means of achieving those goals, which ostensibly poses the greatest
conceivable threat·to Institutional survival and _academic freedom

------ I

I

(~
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.

ln the _FRG. · Pol ltlclzed legal tsm ultimately I fmlts the types of
adjustments untversttles will be able to make, should new socioeconomic contingencies arise •
Th Is cone Ius ron rests rn part on a number of t nterv I ews
conducted with persons who were Involved In all phases of the
legislative process -

actors ranging from members of competing

party factions to cff lclals at the mlntsterlal level, not to
mention those most directly affected by the legislative flurry,
the academic employees.

The only common reaction volced by these

diverse groups was a hlgh degree of dlssatisfatlon.

The HRG,

they malntained, was clearly a case where a bad compromise was
conceivably better than no compromise at al I.

The lawmakers

among them openly admitted that von Unfy_ersJtatsautonomi
e l st
"
nle die Rede gewesen of real dlscusslon.

university autonomy was never a topic

Few of _the university groups were directly

or regularly consulted over a longer period of time.

Few of the

legislators were In a posltlon to ldentlfy strongly wlth the con~
cept of unlverslty autonomy, slnce their primary concern centered
on short-term politlcal accountabl llty.
The Federal Framework Law for Higher Education fn· Its pres.,i.,

~

ent form, and the spectrum of State Adaptation Laws promulgated

ii

ln its wake, do not appear to offer a more 1-ong tastlng resolutlo,n

-

- - - - -- -

of tensions, nor a necessarl ly durable pol ltlcal consensus on role
of hlgher education and the Importance of university autonomy ln

22 ·

the FRG.

Then what has been accomp I ished durl ng 15 years· of (what

critics label) the "re.form hectic?"
In one respect, the reform has taken hold: · the expanslon programs begun In the late sixties have slgntflcantfy broadened citizen access to h lgher education -~ · if you don't ml nd the wa It, that
is.

Waiting periods of three to seven years continue to plague

appl tcants looking for a place In the.hardcore Numerus clausus dlsclpl Ines.

The number of students enrol led In the tertiary sector

has risen lmpresslvly from some 373,000 in 1965 to 788,000 In 1974
and to more than 978,000 in 1978/79.
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The percentage of a gl~en

cohort now attending academic institutions has also jumped frcm
less than six percent in 1965 to roughly twenty percent by 1979.
Reformers have furthermore brought about a measure of stan, dardlzatlon with regard to university administration and degree
requlrements;.but the beauty·of this Important .reform accompllshment appears to be only skin deep.

Substantive as wet I as pol ltl-

cal differences persist· fr,om one state to ·another, especlally- In
relation to the teacher training and recruitment practices which
rema In under the contra I of the Lgnder mIn I sters.

The HRG d Id what

-

It was supposed to do In a limited sense, viz. it provided state-

.-

level pol Icy-makers with a corr.men legal framework •. But a closer
look at the eleven Adaptation Laws leads one to conclude that the
Framework Law ls about as effective In covering up the differences

"
In Lander
educational priorities as were the emperor's new clothes
'

In protecting the sovereign from unfavorable environmental elements.
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The regulations have become more and more detailed with each legal
.

.

turn; the distinctions between qualiftcattons, extrafunctlonal and
otherwise, are more and more acute.

Some of the Lander
"
a I I ow for

organs of student government; others, such as BavarT a.,· have out...
lawed them·.

Some states guarant.ee the lega·I maximum In assigning

representational seats to non-professorial groups, other- hold par.
. .
.
.
.
29
tlclpatlon In dectslon-maklng· bodies to -minimal levels.
Ultimately,
the standardization of academic programs wi 11 depend upon the cooperatlve efforts and compromise agreements worked out by_ the regional
curr I cu I ar reform comm I sslorts, whose members have on I y begun to -tack I e
the task at hand.
Rationalization, that is, the attempt to ensure Job-relevant
training and a degree of professional f lexlbl I lty; whl le simultaneously
stream! lhlng curriculum., accelerating the learning process and holdlng
down costs, Is an objective that can only be attained through the
clever use of mirrors.

Pol ltlclzation of the university reform Issue

has led to greater external control over the cpntent of hfgher learn-

t ng, and. assessments by outs r de agents are t ncreas Ing ly based on econan i c er i ter la.

Ratlona I I zat l on measures may assist po I t t l ca I author-

1t I es In deallng with the question of institutional efficiency; but
moves In this direction ought not to be equated with educational ef. fec1-lveness.

Successful rational lza1-fon wou-ld stgnlfy-1-hat tang Ible

benefits have accrued to lndlv.lduals participating In _the accelera-ted
learning process as a direct consequence of leglslatlve reform activity.

Present academic unemployment statistics In the Federal Republ le
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. .
30
bel Je the benef Its of mass education for mass education's sake. ·
Rat i ona 11 zat I on, t n many respects,· h·as fa 11 ed to ser-v f ce reform
· object! ves.
It ls highly uni ikely that officials in ·t.he Federal Republic
wlll Jump at the chance to engage In a process of "rolling reforms."
What German politician would be wllllng to reopen this leglslatlve
Pandora I s box on a regu I ar I zed. bas.Is?

My susp i c Ion Is that the

academic lhstitutlons themselves would wind up worse for the wear
and tear, as each success Ive package of regu I at Ions Is more bureau.;.
cratlcal ly and legally binding than the one that went before.

Ap-

peals to the Judlclary In rr.atters of higher educational pol !tics
have become more or less standard operating procedure In the German Federa I Repub If c, but Jurl d ica I responses ·per.§.!. do not guarantee that cooperation and coordlnatlon.
partisan groups.

wt 11 ensue among competlng

The "un-iverslty problem" ls In fact symptomatic

of more fundamental social and polltlcal cleavages.

At the basis

of the "educational catastrophe" was a recognition that advanced
I ndustr ta I Germany has become a very comp I ex, · Interdependent soc iety whose problems require col lectlve solutions.

Whether the Sund

or the l.Snder ought to dominate the educatl ona I po I 1cy process is.
no longer the Issue.

Much more serious questions arise regarding

the Judlclary 1 s own instltutio_nal mandate to place constli'utlonal
rights above pol ltlcai imperatives.

In responding directly to Ju-

dicial s-tlmul I, legislators have fa! !en prey to a new double bind:
they have lnadvertantly provided encouragement to citizens, who
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seek to guarantee the practice of lndlvldual rights through the
courts, and the Courts' prescriptions then serve as the basis

for growing restrictions on the freedom of the whole, beyond
the rea Im of academ Ics •.
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